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The use of narrative is ubiquitous in the development, exercise, and communication of expertise.
Expertise and narrative, as complex cognitive capacities, have each been investigated quite deeply,
but little attention has been paid to their interdependence. We offer here the position that
treating these two domains together can fruitfully inform the modeling of expert cognition and
behavior, and present the framework we have been using to develop this approach, the SGOMS
macro-cognitive architecture. Finally, we briefly explore the role of narrative in an SGOMS model
of cooperative video game playing.
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1 Narratives and expertise
The creation and use of narratives is a crucial component of many forms of expertise,
particularly those forms involving multiple actors or which are knowledge-based (e.g., science,
medicine, or education). In this context, narratives highlight the most important elements
of a situation and package them in a coherent way. This serves four principal functions.
First, it allows an individual to form a coherent and tractable representation of a situation
in order to act. The most common form of this is the creation of plans according to goals,
capacities, and environmental elements. Second, narratives facilitate rapid and precise
communication between experts through shared vocabularies (jargon), assumptions, and
conceptual frameworks. These shared elements support the establishment of common ground
between agents [1] which facilitates the integration of efforts. Third, it allows experts to
communicate effectively with the public or non-experts (i.e., those lacking the particular
expertise in question) by simplifying complex bodies of information. This communicative
function also encompasses the use of narratives in teaching, or translating and transferring
expertise. Fourth, narratives are used to position the expert in society and define the
relationship between expert and public. Note that the first and second function are closely
linked, as are the third and fourth.
To illustrate the first three functions, consider the activities of a medical doctor engaged
in treating a patient. In the first stages, the doctor must gather information and integrate
this into existing knowledge, develop a hypothesis about what is wrong, and from that
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understanding create a treatment plan (function 1). Following this, the doctor may have to
co-ordinate specialist physicians, nurses, pharmacists, and technologists, and this process
will be greatly expedited by the group’s shared knowledge and vocabulary (function 2). And
finally, in order for the physician to communicate important aspects of the problem and
proposed treatment to the patient, the doctor will (typically) need to simplify the narrative to
make it comprehensible to the patient (function 3). Limitations of space prevent examination
of function 4, but see [2] for an excellent treatment of the changing function of the expert
narrative within the mental health professions in the 20th century.
In order to understand how expertise is exercised by individuals and coordinated within
groups, we must develop a deeper understanding of the intersection of expert knowledge and
narratives. To this end, we are working to test two related hypotheses. First, that expertise
is structured in consistent ways across both individuals and domains, and second, that these
consistencies are reflected in regular patterns of narrative creation and deployment when
experts work together. In other words, narratives support a set of functions common to
different forms of expertise. This approach is predicated on the idea that the diversity of
forms of expertise is largely a function of the different and complex environments in which
expertise manifests, while the underlying structure of the expertise is often quite consistent.
This is an adaptation of Herbert Simon’s “ant on the beach” metaphor [3], in which he
argues that the apparent complexity of an ant’s behavior as it moves in a convoluted path
across a beach is largely attributable to the complexity of the environment, and not to any
sophisticated scheming or strategizing by the ant.
2 Integrated cognitive modeling frameworks
In Newell’s landmark paper You can’t play 20 questions with nature and win [4], he argued
for efforts toward theoretical unification. Without these efforts, he claimed, the fields of
psychology and cognitive modeling would continue to accumulate experimental data, which
could be used to inform theorizing about isolated phenomena and cognitive capacities, but
little (if any) progress would be made toward understanding cognitive systems as integrated
wholes. Part of the solution Newell proposed was to create cognitive architectures that could
be used to model tasks across a variety of domains. An architecture could then be iteratively
tested and refined through experimentation in different areas, so that over time it becomes
capable of accounting for an ever-broader range of abilities and phenomena.
The framework we have been using is called socio-technical GOMS (SGOMS; [5, 6]),
an extension of the GOMS modeling framework [7]. This is an attempt to implement the
approach championed by Newell, with a focus on modeling cognition and behavior in complex,
multi-agent scenarios. The principal extension is the incorporation of the macro-architecture
hypothesis [8], which claims, inter-alia, that there are consistencies in the ways that experts
decompose different types of tasks, and that we should use these consistencies in developing
systematic methods for the creation of cognitive models. It is a methodological approach
aimed at limiting the proliferation of unrelated models and theories. Here, we are primarily
concerned with two things: first, how the abilities and limitations of a cognitive system lead
to consistencies in the way that tasks are decomposed, both across individuals and across
domains, and second, the importance of narrative structures in complex and/or multi-agent
task performance.
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2.1 Task decomposition: unit tasks and planning units
It is common practice in cognitive modeling to first construct a unit-task model of a task,
which is a high-level conceptual model of how an agent divides a task into parts. A single
unit-task is a set of operations or actions that can be executed as a unit to achieve some
goal. In the GOMS modeling framework, the task is partitioned into unit-tasks such that
they help the agent to avoid downtime and overload [8]. With SGOMS, we have added the
constraint that unit-tasks should be unlikely to be interrupted, and added an additional,
higher-level control structure called planning units, which is typically a set of unit tasks,
the sequential execution of which is intended to achieve some higher-level objective. The
motivation for these additions is that we wish to model experts in chaotic, multi-agent,
real-world scenarios in which interruptions may be frequent and costly, and GOMS models
often have difficulty with such scenarios [9]. We believe that experts develop strategies to
minimize the impacts of interruptions and to adapt to unexpected events, particularly in
situations involving multiple agents and chaotic environments. In such environments, one of
the principle functions of a planning unit co-ordination, allowing each individual to react
locally without the need to re-convene and create a new global plan. Another function is to
allow individuals to efficiently pass information back and forth. And finally, planning units
allow for interruption and resumption.
2.2 Cooperative experts and narratives
In recent work [10], we have found that, through cooperative activity, experts quickly develop
shared planning units and create names for them. These then become the principal unit
of communication by which the experts coordinate their efforts. We consider individual
planning units to be “micro-narratives,” while the chaining together of multiple planning
units forms the overall “expert narrative” that guides each expert’s behavior and helps
groups of experts to coordinate their efforts. Our conception of narratives owes much to
Todorov’s idea that narratives consist of passage from one equilibrium to another due to
some disturbing force [14]. A planning unit comprises the initial environmental conditions
under which its application is appropriate, a final desired state, and a sequence of actions by
which the final state may be achieved. This structure fits naturally with production system
modeling frameworks, such as the one we are using: Python ACT-R [8]. We turn now to the
process of building these models.
2.3 Data collection and modeling procedure
Constructing SGOMS models involves three steps. First, experts in the domain of interest
must be observed or recorded performing the activities of interest. By communicating with
the expert during this process and taking notes about their behavior, we can sketch an outline
of the elements of the task. Second, once this initial sketch has been made, we construct a
paper-and-pen process model of the planning units and unit tasks that make up the task.
We compare this early model against collected data of expert behavior, which is primarily in
the form of video recordings and protocol analysis. We iteratively change and compare the
model to incorporate all observed environmental conditions and agent actions. Once we have
a model that is capable of accounting for all “reasonable next actions”, i.e., experts do not
deviate from the action options of the model, we implement the model in Python ACT-R.
This third and final step is accomplished via a graphical modeling interface which we have
developed. The interface allows a user to create a “virtual paper-and-pen” SGOMS model,
while the back-end of the interface can compiles this model Python ACT-R code [10].
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2.4 Example model: cooperative video game playing
We have developed a model of two people cooperatively playing a first-person shooter video
game, Gears of War 3. This is a very fast, chaotic game, and was chosen because of the high
frequency of interruptions and the cooperative mode of play. We do not present the details
of the model here, but see [8, 10] for more. The model is presented here to illustrate the
usefulness of narrative constructs in modeling expert cooperation.
Our data revealed players using two distinct forms of communication while playing the
video game. We have called these “command” and “coordinate”. “Command” exchanges
were one or two word utterances, such as “left side”, “he’s charging”, or “run”. This was
predominant when there was a lot of action on the screen. In the second form, “coordinate”,
the players exchanged longer utterances, such as “set up a cross fire at the opening”. These
were strategic adjustments or negotiations, and occurred when there was a lull in the action.
These shifts in communication style were interesting for two reasons. First, the shift
from one style to the other was quite marked, and mapped onto clear changes in the action
of the game. Second, and more importantly, the utterances made when players were in
the “command” style mapped directly onto unit tasks, whereas the utterances made in the
“coordinate” style mapped directly onto planning units. Thus we interpreted the cycling
between communication styles as players first creating shared planning units (which involved
establishing a common narrative for where they were, where they wanted to go, and how
to they planned to get there), and then continually updating each other about the current
situation. Note that the difference in the function and form of these two communication
styles maps quite nicely onto narrative functions one and two, above: “command” represents
rapid communication, and ”coordinate” represents plan formation.
A final point of interest is that when we used an “expert-substitution” method, replacing
one of the highly skilled players with a novice, we often observed the remaining expert
instructing the novice using modified versions of the planning units just mentioned. This
effectively “scaffolded” the abilities of the novice, improving the play of the novice quite
rapidly. This reflects the third narrative function mentioned above, communication with
non-experts.
3 Conclusion
The work presented here has, thus far, been largely exploratory. We have been investigating
the intersections and interdependencies of narrative and expertise through cognitive modeling,
and have had promising initial results. We have found that the functions of narrative in
facilitating the use and transfer of expertise are captured quite nicely by the SGOMS macro-
architecture, and are currently developing new models to examine how robust these findings
are across domains. Future work will examine both lower-level instantiations of our models
(in SGOMS:ACT-R, [10]) as well as higher-level investigations, in models of many-agent
models of distributed cognition.
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